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1The normativity of nature in Pufendorf and Locke 
Hannah Dawson1
I
At the beginning of one of the centrepieces of early-modern natural law theory, De 
Jure Naturae et Gentium (1672), Samuel von Pufendorf presented a complete break 
between nature and morality. He envisaged a landscape of bodies in motion on which 
artificial moral entities are superimposed.2 He was followed down this arid path by his 
great admirer, John Locke, in An Essay concerning Humane Understanding (1689). 
Locke reprised Pufendorf’s starkly bifurcated vision of real existence on the one hand, 
and moral ideas – pure fabrications of the mind – on the other.3 In a world that was 
being variously deanimated by the so-called scientific revolution, Pufendorf and 
Locke joined in, emptying nature of its Aristotelian substantial forms, and reducing it 
to the push and pull of one huge, corpuscularian machine. Disenchanted matter could 
not be responsible for its own activity. Indeed, it could not act at all. Only men (and it 
usually was only ‘men’), through liberty and rationality, could haul themselves out of 
the necessary and unreflective mire of nature, and become moral agents. Morality, on 
this view, was not only radically distinct from nature, but its purpose was to suppress 
and subdue it. Accordingly, nature, on this view, was not only amoral, but veered 
towards immorality, too. Pufendorf and Locke, therefore, leading lights in the 
European republic of letters, seem to figure morality as a curb on nature, and to point 
to a gulf between nature and normativity, between what we are and what we ought to 
be. 
1 This article began life as the inaugural Balzan-Skinner Lecture that I delivered at the University of 
Cambridge. A long time has since elapsed, mainly because of motherhood and its complications, but 
also because I have tried to develop my argument in response to the brilliant comments I received on 
that happy day. I am indebted to Quentin Skinner, who endowed the Balzan-Skinner Prize in a 
characteristic act of generosity to the historical profession, and to both the International Balzan Prize 
Foundation and CRASSH for their indispensable support. I am grateful to Annabel Brett, Chris Brooke, 
Mark Goldie, Lena Halldenius, James Harris, Clare Jackson, Susan James, John Robertson, Richard 
Serjeantson, and the anonymous reviewers of this article, all of whom have given me hugely helpful 
feedback. 
2 Samuel von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, trans. Basil Kennet (Oxford, 1703), pp. 1-
3. I use the first edition of Kennet’s translation to get closest to an early-modern English reading of 
Pufendorf’s text. I have compared it to the Latin, which Locke owned, in part to indicate relevant 
departures from the original, but also because sometimes the Latin speaks especially powerfully to my 
argument, as well as pointing to Locke’s immersion in the Latin text. More generally, I have flagged up 
the (sometimes Latin) intertextuality between sources, suggesting that the two views I delineate in this 
article are langues as much as paroles. 
3 John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975), p. 
429. 
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2I argue, however, that at times they bridge this gulf, that in addition to their 
principal account of morality, Pufendorf and Locke give voice to an alternative view. 
Perhaps struggling with the reality that people are not as free or rational as morality 
had seemed to require, and unwilling in the end to relinquish the old idea of nature as 
teleological, and the source of the good, they beat back across their own clear blue 
water. They suggest that we are more like nature’s brutes than fantasy’s humans, 
worked on inertly, irresistibly, by the levers of passion and impulse, that the cogs and 
wheels of nature might turn us toward virtue. Moral action and understanding turns 
out to be as much the result of automatic sensation as circuitous reason, as much 
uncalculated instinct as clear-sighted autonomy. This re-visioning of normativity has 
implications not only for our understanding early-modern moral philosophy, but also 
for the history of political thought. In particular, it takes us some way to resolving one 
of the great paradoxes of Locke’s political theory, as I will suggest at the end of this 
article.
In constructing the argument outlined above, I am making three interventions 
in the scholarship. The prevailing view of Pufendorf’s and Locke’s moral theories, 
and indeed of much of seventeenth-century moral theory is – quite rightly –that 
morality tended to be understood as a law imposed on otherwise recalcitrant human 
nature, deduced and enacted with reason and freedom.4 I am adding a kind of 
naturalism to that view, and, in so doing, I am questioning the characterisation and 
valorisation of autonomous reason that remains associated with post-Cartesian 
thought, and still underpins the discipline of analytic philosophy. I am therefore 
pitching into revisionist commentary that has at least in part been energised by the 
feminist turn in historiography, to argue that for seventeenth-century authors, reason, 
understood as the self-directed analysis of clear and distinct ideas, does not capture all 
4 E.g. Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish 
Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1996), p. 6; Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity 
(Cambridge, 1996), pp. 4-5; J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral 
Philosophy (Cambridge, 1998), p. 4. On Pufendorf, see, e.g., Pauline C. Westerman, The 
Disintegration of Natural Law Theory: Aquinas to Finnis (Leiden, 1998), p. 288. On the centrality of 
reason and freedom in Locke, see, e.g., Ian Harris, The mind of John Locke: A study of political theory 
in its intellectual setting (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 252-79; Gideon Yaffe, Liberty Worth the Name: Locke 
on Free Agency (Princeton, 2000); Alex Tuckness, Locke and the Legislative Point of View: 
Toleration, Contested Principles, and the Law (Princeton, 2002); Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and 
Equality: Christian Foundations of John Locke’s Political Thought (Cambridge, 2002). Cf. Jill Kraye, 
‘Conceptions of Moral Philosophy’, in Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, eds., The Cambridge History 
of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (2 vols., Cambridge, 1998), II, pp. 1279-1316, p. 1307. Some 
commentators, e.g., Steven Forde, Locke, Science and Politics (Cambridge, 2013), p. 12, still hive 
Locke off from theology; for a rebuttal, see Tim Stanton’s own Balzan-Skinner lecture, ‘John Locke 
and the fable of liberalism’, Historical Journal 61 (2018), pp. 597-622.
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3that it means to be thoughtful, and by the same token that reason is capacious, 
encompassing or at least companionable with imagination, intuition, and passion – the 
‘buzzing confusion of consciousness’, as Genevieve Lloyd puts it.5 
My second intervention is to propose not only that we go beyond thinking of 
early-modern morality simply as a law external to mankind, but also that we need not 
tie ourselves in knots over the basis of that law. Much of the commentary on 
seventeenth-century natural law focuses on where particular authors stood in the 
scholastic dispute between rationalists and voluntarists – between those, following 
Aquinas, who thought that morality is a function of reason, and those, following 
Ockham, who thought that it is a function of God’s will.6 This preoccupation makes 
sense, of course, and intersects closely with the contradiction I am exploring in this 
article (is morality imposed on and against our nature, or is it part of it?).7 I want to 
suggest, however, that the old conundrum of how God might be omnipotent and 
bound is not the whole story. Indeed, it seems to me that so much of the commentary 
on Locke in particular gets itself into such contortions over this problem precisely 
because it was not Locke’s primary concern to find a solution, if indeed he saw it as a 
problem at all.8 Insofar as Pufendorf and Locke were interested, and insofar as it helps 
to categorise them within this framework, they were, to quote James Tully, ‘mitigated 
5 Genevieve Lloyd, ‘The Man of Reason’, Metaphilosophy, 10 (1979), pp. 18-37, p. 32 (talking here 
about Leibniz). Cf. Idem, The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ & ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy (York, 1984); 
Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford, 1997); 
Victoria Kahn, Neil Saccamano, and Daniela Coli, eds., Politics and the Passions 1500-1850 
(Princeton, 2006). See also Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton, 1977). On 
the tenacity of the reason/passion divide, see, e.g., Terence Cuneo, ‘Reason and the passions’, in James 
A. Harris, ed., The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 2013), 
pp. 226-47. 
6 See Haakonssen, Natural Law, p. 6; Petter Korkman, ‘Voluntarism and Moral Obligation: 
Barbeyrac’s Defence of Pufendorf Revisited’, in Tim Hochstrasser and Peter Schröder, eds., Early 
Modern Natural Law Theories (Dordrecht, 2003), pp. 195-225.
7 See Peter Harrison, ‘Voluntarism and Early Modern Science’, History of Science, 40 (2002), pp. 63-
89; Idem, The Territories of Science and Religion (Chicago, 2015); John Henry, ‘Voluntarist theology 
at the origins of Modern Science: A Response to Peter Harrison’, History of Science, 47 (2009), pp. 79-
113.
8 On the long-standing endeavour to pin down Locke’s position, see Raghuveer Singh, ‘John Locke and 
the theory of natural law’, Political Studies, IX (1961), pp. 105-18; John Colman, John Locke’s Moral 
Philosophy (Edinburgh, 1983); David E. Soles, ‘Intellectualism and Natural Law in Locke’s Second 
Treatise’, History of Political Thought 8 (1) (1987), pp. 63-81; W. Randall Ward, ‘Divine Will, Natural 
Law and the voluntarism/intellectualism debate in Locke’, History of Political Thought 16 (1995), pp. 
208-18; Francis Oakley, ‘Locke, natural law and God – again’, History of Political Thought 18 (1997), 
pp. 624-51; Alex Tuckness, ‘The Coherence of a Mind: John Locke and the Law of Nature’, Journal of 
the History of Philosophy, 37 (1999), pp. 73-90; John Colman, ‘Locke’s empiricist theory of the law of 
nature’, in Peter R. Anstey, ed., The Philosophy of John Locke: New Perspectives (London, 2003), pp. 
106-26. For a dazzling challenge to the voluntarist/realist taxonomy, as well as insights into nature and 
liberty, see Annabel S. Brett, Liberty, right and nature: Individual rights in later scholastic thought 
(Cambridge, 1997).
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4voluntarists’.9 That is, insofar as they viewed morality as a law imposed on mankind 
by God, they thought that it followed necessarily from the creature God had freely 
created and to whom he had given reason to infer. This is after all why they called it 
natural law, because it could be worked out by natural reason, as opposed to 
revelation. I want to show that in addition to treating morality as an external 
constraint on nature, these writers looked to nature herself – and irrational, even 
involuntary nature at that, as a source of normativity – which, in turn, further queries 
the primacy of the axis of reason and will on which the rationalist/voluntarist debate 
pivots.  
My third intervention follows from this. It concerns the appropriate contexts in 
which to situate Pufendorf and Locke, and, connectedly, the question of continuity 
and change in natural law discourse and where these authors sit in that particular 
narrative. Scholars often point to a change that occurred at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, when Grotius ushered in the ‘modern’ theory of natural law, 
grounded on self-interest, as a response to scepticism.10 Rather than focusing on 
scepticism, I join other scholars in emphasising the importance of two further contexts 
in early modernity that, in turn, point to endurances and debts rather than sharp 
breaks. 
The first context is scholastic natural jurisprudence. Rather than the 
voluntarist/rationalist controversy therein, what seems to press especially hard on both 
authors is the stringent account of virtue – a virtue that must be freely and knowingly 
chosen, and chosen for its own sake, a virtue that can have nothing to do with stupid, 
or knee-jerk, or selfish, nature. It is this high bar for the good that appears in 
Pufendorf’s and Locke’s principal accounts of morality, and that had already been set, 
9 James Tully, An approach to political philosophy: Locke in contexts (Cambridge, 1993), p. 281. Cf. 
Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law, ed. James Tully, trans. Michael 
Silverthorne (Cambridge, 1991), p. 36; Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, ed. W. von Leyden 
(Oxford, 1954), p. 199. 
10 Richard Tuck, Philosophy and government 1572-1651 (Cambridge, 1993); cf. Haakonssen, Natural 
Law, pp. 24-6. See also Charles Larmore, ‘Scepticism’, in Garber and Ayers, eds., Cambridge History 
II, pp. 1145-92; Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment (Oxford, 2002); Richard Popkin, The History 
of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle (Oxford, 2003). For complicating accounts, pointing instead 
and overlappingly to Aristotelian scholasticism (and, in Brett’s case, Stoicism), see Johann P. 
Sommerville, ‘Selden, Grotius, and the Seventeenth-Century Intellectual Revolution in Moral and 
Political Theory’, in Victoria Kahn and Lorna Hutson, eds., Rhetoric & Law in Early Modern Europe 
(New Haven, 2001), pp. 319-44; Annabel Brett, ‘Natural Right and Civil Community: The Civil 
Philosophy of Hugo Grotius’, Historical Journal, 45 (2002), pp. 31-51; Idem ‘‘The Matter, Forme, and 
Power of a Common-wealth’: Thomas Hobbes and Late Renaissance Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Politics’, Hobbes Studies, 23 (2010), pp. 72-102; Cees Leijenhorst, The Mechanization of 
Aristotelianism: The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes’ Natural Philosophy (Leiden, 2001).
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5for example, in the most important Jesuit scholastic text of the period, Francisco 
Suárez’s De Legibus, ac Deo Legislatore (1612). 
The second context that I flag up is Stoicism, the importance of which for 
Pufendorf and, especially, Locke, is less well appreciated.11 Stoicism had many 
strands, which were themselves interwoven with strands from other schools, and often 
twisted out of recognition in the complex, active early-modern reception of antiquity, 
such that one sometimes wonders whether it makes sense to talk about schools of 
thought at all. There is, for example, one Stoic strand that calls you to act according to 
reason, willingly, not heaved this way or that by fate or passion, and intertwines with 
the stern scholastic injunctions that run through Pufendorf’s and Locke’s own stern 
accounts of morality. There is, though, another Stoic strand, that seems to me to lace 
along the softer, alternative, naturalistic, iteration of morality that I identify in these 
authors. For the Stoics, to live according to virtue is, by definition, to live according 
to nature. Indeed, as Diogenes Laertius put it, paraphrasing Zeno, in his compendium 
of the lives of Greek philosophers (of which Locke owned two copies), ‘nature leads 
us towards virtue’.12 Again, this tight connection between nature and virtue is not 
peculiar to Stoicism; it resonates in scholasticism, and indeed pervaded most ancient 
11 In his Introduction (pp. 1-92) to Locke’s Essays, von Leyden ignores Stoicism as a source, and (p. 
35) dismisses Cicero as insignificant. See also Daniel Carey, Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: 
Contesting Diversity in the Enlightenment and Beyond (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 34-68. Commentators 
are, however, gathering to highlight the importance of Stoicism for early-modern thought, including, 
now, for Locke; see, e.g., M.A. Stewart, ‘The Stoic legacy in the early Scottish Enlightenment’, in 
Margaret J. Osler, ed., Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European 
Thought (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 2743-96; Jon Parkin, Science Religion, and Politics in Restoration 
England: Richard Cumberland’s De legibus naturae (Woodbridge, 1999); A.A. Long, ‘Stoicism in the 
Philosophical Tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler’, in Jon Millar and Brad Inwood, eds., Hellenistic and 
early-modern philosophy (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 7-29; H.W. Blom and Laurens C. Winkel, eds., 
Grotius and the Stoa (Assen, 2004); Victor Nuovo, ‘Aspects of Stoicism in Locke’s Philosophy’ in 
Christianity, Antiquity, and Enlightenment (Dordrecht, 2011), pp. 181-205; Christopher Brooke, 
Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau (Princeton, 2012). On 
Pufendorf’s Stoicism, see M. J. Seidler, ‘Introductory Essay’, in Idem, ed., Samuel Pufendorf’s “On 
the Natural State of Men” (Lewiston, 1990), pp. 1-69, p. 49; Kari Saastamoinem, ‘Pufendorf and the 
Stoic Model of Natural Law’, Grotiana 22 (2001), pp. 257-69; Fiammetta Palladini, ‘Pufendorf and 
Stoicism’, Grotiana (2002), pp. 245-55; Jon Parkin, ‘Taming the Leviathan: Reading Hobbes in 
Seventeenth-Century Europe’, in Hochstrasser and Schröder, eds., Early Modern Natural Law, pp. 31-
52, p. 45. There are further overlapping intellectual contexts, some of which I touch on in the article, 
such as Epicureanism and Augustinianism, on the conjunction of which see John Robertson, The Case 
for The Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680-1760 (Cambridge, 2005); see also Neven Leddy and 
Avi Lifschitz, eds., Epicurus in the Enlightenment (Oxford, 2009). For a ground-breaking account of 
English attitudes to ancient philosophy, see Dmitri Levitin, Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New 
Science: Histories of Philosophy in England, c. 1640-1700 (Cambridge, 2015). 
12 A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, eds., The Hellenistic philosophers (2 vols., Cambridge, 1987), I, p. 
395; John Harrison and Peter Laslett, The Library of John Locke (Oxford, 1965), p. 124. See Gisela 
Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 209-97. 
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6thought until Augustine took it so devastatingly to task.13 But while this chorus is 
certainly ringing in the ears of Pufendorf and Locke, it is in my view the sense-based, 
naturalistic tune within Stoicism, merging with the new experimental philosophy that 
gives our authors one of their distinctive melodies. Moreover, looking forward as well 
as back, by refiguring Pufendorf and Locke in a (Stoic) naturalistic tradition, I 
propose that we continue to rethink the caesura still tenacious in the history of 
philosophy between the voluntarist natural jurists of the seventeenth century and the 
theorists of moral sentiment of the next.14
It might be objected that the contradiction to which this article draws attention 
– that virtue seems sometimes to coincide with, and sometimes to oppose, nature – 
can be explained away when one considers the manifold and shifting uses of the 
concept of nature. Nature, after all, in the Stoic use might often be synonymous with 
Reason. And more generally in early-modern thought, nature teetered on the line 
between divinity and brutishness, and, overlappingly, on the brink of mind and matter. 
As two seventeenth-century dictionaries put the ambiguity in their respective 
definitions of nature: ‘God, or devine reason sowen in all the world’ on the one hand, 
13 See Malcolm Scholfield and Gisela Striker, eds., The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics 
(Cambridge, 1986). On Stoic epistemology and morality, see R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and 
Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy (London, 1996), pp. 20-23; 123-5. 
14 See Amy M. Schmitter, ‘Passions and affections’, in Peter Anstey, ed., The Oxford Handbook of 
British Philosophy in The Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 2013), pp. 442-71; James A. Harris, Hume: An 
Intellectual Biography (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 126-30; Henning Graf Reventlow, ‘Morality, reason and 
history as factors in biblical interpretation’, in Euan Cameron, ed., The Cambridge History of The Bible 
From 1450-1750 (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 641-56, p. 653. On the history of natural jurisprudence, see: 
Duncan Forbes, ‘Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment’, in R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner, 
eds., The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh, 1982), pp. 186-204; John 
Dunn, ‘From applied theology to social analysis: the break between John Locke and the Scottish 
Enlightenment’, in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds., Wealth & Virtue: The Shaping of Political 
Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 119-35; Istvan Hont and Michael 
Ignatieff, ‘Needs and justice in the ‘Wealth of Nations’, in Wealth & Virtue, pp. 1-44; Knud 
Haakonssen, Natural Law; Richard Tuck, ‘The ‘modern’ theory of natural law’, in Anthony Pagden, 
ed., The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 99-120; Istvan 
Hont, ‘The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical Foundations 
of the ‘Four-Stages’ Theory’, in Pagden, ed., Languages of Political Theory, pp. 253-76; M. J. Seidler, 
‘Introductory Essay’, in Seidler, ed. and trans., Samuel Pufendorf’s “On the Natural State of Men” 
(Lewiston, 1990), pp. 1-69; Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to 
Hume (Oxford, 1991);  Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal Ought: 1640-1740 
(Cambridge, 1995); Idem, ‘Norm and Normativity’, in Knud Haakonssen, ed., The Cambridge History 
of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 987-1025; J. B. Schneewind, The Invention 
of Autonomy (Cambridge 1998); T.J. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment 
(Cambridge, 2000); Annabel S. Brett, ‘The development of the idea of citizens’ rights’, in Quentin 
Skinner and Bo Stråth, eds., States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 
97-112; Annabel S. Brett, Changes of State: Nature and the limits of the city in early modern natural 
law (Princeton, 2011); Hochstrasser and Schröder, Early Modern Natural Law; Ian Hunter, Rival 
Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge, 2009); 
Sarah Hutton, ‘From Cudworth to Hume: Cambridge Platonism and the Scottish Enlightenment’, 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 42 (2012), 8-26; Jon Parkin and Tim Stanton, eds., Natural law and 
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7and on the other, ‘the innate Principle of Motion and Rest, depending upon a 
necessary Series of Causes’.15 It is clear that nature might well line up with morality 
when the reasonable, theistic, signification is in use, and not when it is abridged to 
mechanistic necessity, or to nature red in tooth and claw. And, certainly, Pufendorf 
and Locke often fall into step along exactly these lines, giving voice to sacred, 
rational nature. For example, while Locke does not identify God and nature, as 
Spinoza does, God’s providence permeates every leaf and eye of Locke’s vision of the 
world. As he announces in the Essay, ‘the Wisdom and Goodness of the Maker 
plainly appears in all the Parts of this stupendous Frabrick’.16 God’s divine design is 
so omnipresent that God and nature often act as near-synonyms for Locke, such as 
when he is explaining how the senses are ‘wisely ordered by Nature’, or how ‘nature 
or God (as I should say more correctly)’ could have ‘created man differently’.17 
Locke’s and Pufendorf’s uses of the word ‘nature’ are deeply unstable, just as in 
contemporary usage more broadly – and this is my point. Sliding in their uses, for 
example, between providence, Aristotelian teleology, postlapsarian depravity, neutral 
matter, and a deanimated machine, they thereby inhabit, magnify, and reorganise 
early-modern moral discourse. As well as exposing the tensions within that discourse, 
they fuse and rethink the binaries they inherit, suggesting that there is life and purpose 
in the machine, that the brute forces of nature might, with God’s blessing, push us to 
at least the appearance of virtue.
Interesting in itself, this ambivalence also raises an important question about 
what moral agency looks like here. It is not obvious, that is to say, that pushed in this 
mechanical, brutish, unthinking way, human animals can count as truly moral agents. 
Indeed, that is the thrust of Pufendorf’s and Locke’s original position: if we do not 
know what we ought to do, and do not knowingly, freely decide what to do, then we 
cannot be justly rewarded or punished for our actions. While their naturalistic 
tendencies do sometimes catch them in this snare, however, I suggest that they also 
point to a rich and holistic view of virtue and cognition, one that incorporates the 
spontaneous springs of the mind, so that even if we do not forge our lives in a blaze of 
toleration in the early enlightenment (Oxford, 2013); John Robertson, ‘Sacred History and Political 
Thought: Neapolitan Responses to the Problem of Sociability after Hobbes’, Historical Journal, 56 
(2013), pp. 1-29.
15 John Florio, Queen Anna’s New World of Words, or dictionarie of the Italian and English tongues 
(London, 1611), p. 329; Edward Phillips, The New World of Words (London, 1696), sig. Bbbb3v.
16 Locke, Essay, p. 148.
17 Locke, Essay, p. 150; Essays, p. 199.
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8reason and liberty, we might nonetheless be deemed morally engaged and 
accountable, capable of doing the right thing.
This article will begin by laying out Pufendorf’s and Locke’s accounts of the 
divide between nature and morality, and then demonstrate the ways in which both 
authors cross the divide.
Before I embark, I should say why I have chosen to focus on them in tandem. 
In part, it is because Locke admired Pufendorf’s natural law theory, and there is 
therefore a connection between the two authors. More significantly still, I focus on 
these two because of the parallel between their striking, riven, metaphysics: 
Pufendorf’s extraordinary vision of a world cracked in two – morality on the one side, 
nature on the other – with which he opens his De Jure, that then recurs so powerfully 
throughout Locke’s Essay. Looking at Locke through Pufendorf therefore not only 
shines a peculiarly bright light on the Englishman’s moral metaphysics, but they 
illuminate each other. Moreover, this is not just an article about the mark that 
Pufendorf made on Locke, but an article about Pufendorf, too. After all, Locke 
diverges from Pufendorf in radical ways, most obviously in Pufendorf’s permission of 
absolute sovereignty by contrast with Locke’s condemnation of it as a form of 
slavery. Locke’s own views also change over time, and he is receptive to a great many 
other influences – indeed as mentioned above, some of these, such as Suárez, loom 
large over both Pufendorf and Locke.18 Besides, Locke only acquired Pufendorf’s De 
Jure and De Officio (1673) in the late 1670s and was reading the former in 1681 – 
many years after he (in c. 1664) had written his most explicitly Stoic work, his Essays 
on the Law of Nature (although Pufendorf’s Elementorum Jurisprudentiae 
Universalis was published in 1660). In addition to mooting lines of influence, 
therefore, I am uncovering common ground between these two big beasts of 
seventeenth-century natural law theory, and in doing so, gesturing towards a hitherto 
underappreciated discourse of early-modern moral philosophy: the normativity of 
nature.
18 On Locke’s engagement with Pufendorf, see Harrison and Laslett, The Library, p. 215; Locke, 
‘Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman’, in Political Essays, ed. Mark Goldie 
(Cambridge, 1997), pp. 348-55, p. 352. Cf. von Leyden, Essays, pp. 38-9; Hont and Ignatieff, ‘Needs 
and justice’, pp. 36-42; John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility 
(Cambridge, 1994), pp. 201-4; Michael J. Seidler, ‘The Politics of Self-Preservation: Toleration and 
Identity in Pufendorf and Locke’, in Hochstrasser and Schröder, eds., Early Modern Natural Law, pp. 
227-55. On Locke’s republic of letters, see John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early 
Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 469-535. 
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I turn first to Pufendorf’s and Locke’s efforts to hold morality apart from nature. All 
‘Being’ or ‘Ens’, for Pufendorf, is split into ‘Substance’ and ‘Mode’ (‘substantiam & 
modum’). Moral entities are a subcategory of modes. They ‘have no Self-Subsistence’ 
(‘entia moralia non per se subsistere’) but are rather ‘affectiones’, or ‘Properties’ as 
Basil Kennett translates them, of substances. Unlike ‘Natural Entities’, which are 
created, the production of moral entities, says Pufendorf, ‘cannot be better express’d 
than by the Term of Imposition [impositionis]’. They are entirely artificial, pure 
inventions, owing ‘their whole Existence’ to ‘the Pleasure [ex arbitrio]’ of intelligent 
beings – to God, who invents the fundamental rules, and to men, who make up all the 
rest. They are ‘impos’d’ on the otherwise ‘horrid Stupidity of the dumb Creation’, for 
the ‘guiding and tempering’ of men, for ‘the polishing and the methodizing of 
Common Life’, so that human beings should not ‘pass their Life like Beasts, without 
Culture and without Rule’. Leaving behind him a decimated hylomorphic world, 
littered with political animals and final ends, Pufendorf insists that moral qualities do 
not ‘proceed from Principles ingrafted in the Substance of Things’.19 
Woven into this natural philosophical polemic is Pufendorf’s voluntarist 
conviction that things are not good or bad in themselves but only insofar as they 
conform to, or diverge from, the will of a legislator. As Pufendorf writes, ‘since 
Honesty…and Turpitude are Affections of Human Deeds, arising from their 
agreeableness or disagreeableness to a Rule or a Law, and since a Law is the 
Command of a Superior, it do’s not appear how we can conceive any Goodness or 
Turpitude before all Law, and without the Imposition of a Superior.’20 This is why, he 
goes on, in the kind of apparently sceptical formulation that horrifies his 
contemporaries, ‘in reality all the Motions and Actions of Men, upon setting aside all 
Law, both Divine and Human, are perfectly indifferent’.21 Language and education 
dupe us into delusions of moral realism by injecting evaluative components into what 
should be purely descriptive terminology, such as ‘Adultery’ and ‘Incest’.22 
19 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 2; De Jure Naturae et Gentium (Lund, 1672), pp. 2-4 (I will refer to 
this edition unless otherwise specified). 
20 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 13.
21 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 14. 
22 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 15.
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Pufendorf’s radical expulsion of morality from nature applies not only to 
obviously moral notions but to all concepts we might call cultural, that is, to all those 
constructs that orient the greatest part of our lives. For example, a man is not 
intrinsically a ‘Citizen’ or a ‘Stranger’, but has one of these ‘Moral Situation[s]’ 
placed upon him.23 However, it is worth noting that even here, when Pufendorf’s 
explicit ambition is to establish the gulf between nature and morality, he countenances 
the idea that an artificial imposition may effect a natural change. Being given the 
persona of a consul or a doctor, for example, some ‘Parts and Dispositions’ of a 
man’s nature might be ‘rouz’d and enliven’d’.24 Already then, there is the suggestion 
that moral concepts are not simply masks, to be donned and discarded at will, but are 
rather clamped on so tight that they might transform our internal constitutions. 
Locke repeats Pufendorf’s dichotomy of nature and morality almost word for 
word, Pufendorf’s Latin as well as his ideas, suffusing Locke’s metaphysics. In the 
Essay, Locke divides complex ideas into ‘Substances’ on the one hand, and ‘Modes’ 
on the other. He explains that modes do not subsist in themselves but are 
‘Dependences on, or Affections of Substances’.25 Actions, such as ‘Adultery, or 
Incest’, are a kind of ‘mixed Mode’ insofar as they are collections of ideas put 
together ‘very arbitrarily’ without ‘reference to any real Existence’.26 And even 
substances, in a thorough evacuation of essences, ‘are made by the mind, and not by 
Nature’.27 Gone are the intrinsic purposes of wolves and men, replaced now by blank 
and unknowable arrangements of matter. 
Just as for Pufendorf, so for Locke, actions only become good or bad when 
they are related to a law. ‘Duelling’, for example, is morally neutral, and susceptible 
to various evaluative complexions: it becomes a ‘Sin’ when compared to the law of 
God, but ‘Vertue’ when measured against the law of fashion. And, just as for 
Pufendorf, it is language that is at fault for fooling people into imagining that actions 
are inherently good or bad. As Locke puts it, words, such as ‘Drunkenness’ or 
‘Stealing’, tend to hide the distinction between the ‘Idea of the Action, and its Moral 
Relation’, thereby obscuring the fundamental moral indifference of things from ‘those 
who yield too easily to the Impressions of Sounds, and are forward to take Names for 
23 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 6.
24 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 7. 
25 Locke, Essay, p. 165; Locke lists a third category of complex ideas – relations between ideas – but 
tends to subsume them under mixed modes, e.g., p. 437. 
26 Locke, Essay, p. 429. 
27 Locke, Essay, p. 453.
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Things’.28 Morality is simply the relation of neutral, made-up, ideas to rules, or as 
Locke had already put it in his Essays: ‘there is no fault, no guilt, where there is no 
law.’29 
The artificiality and voluntarism of moral law reeked of scepticism to many of 
Locke’s readers. As Thomas Burnet, backing up Stillingfleet in 1697, spluttered: ‘if 
his [God’s] Will be the Original Rule of Good and Evil, and that Will go by no Rule, 
there is no Rule of Sin to him: All things are Indifferent, till he declare This or That to 
be Sin, according to his Pleasure’.30 Locke, however, was indignant about the ‘Storm’, 
as he called it, that was gathering against him.31 He maintained that it is precisely the 
synthetic character of morality that gives it the sure footing of scientific certainty. 
Thomas Hobbes had articulated this arresting position in De Homine (1658). A priori 
demonstration is only possible, wrote Hobbes, about ‘those things whose generation 
depends on the will of men themselves’. This is why we can have certain, true, 
knowledge of pure forms of mathematics, such as geometry – ‘because we ourselves 
draw the lines’ and ‘the generation of the figures depends on our will’. 32 Unlike 
‘natural things’, the causes of which ‘are not in our power, but in the divine will’, and 
about which we can have only a posteriori understanding, ‘politics and ethics (that is, 
the sciences of just and unjust, of equity and inequity) can be demonstrated a priori; 
because we ourselves make the principles’.33 Locke enthusiastically makes the same 
point. It is because moral ideas are ‘not of Nature’s but Man’s making’, 
‘Combinations of several Ideas, that the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put together’, 
and therefore ‘adequate’ (fully known), and the agreement or disagreement between 
them perfectly intelligible – that ‘Morality is capable of Demonstration, as well as 
Mathematicks’.34 
Pufendorf, by contrast, had met the sceptical charge on his would-be accusers’ 
own ground. Explicitly repudiating Hobbes’ defence of maker’s knowledge precisely 
because, he chimed in, it results in relativism, Pufendorf stressed that while God was 
free to make mankind as he liked, the law of nature followed necessarily from the 
28 Locke, Essay, p. 359.
29 Locke, Essays, p. 119. 
30 Thomas Burnet, Second Remarks Upon An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding (London, 
1697), p. 22.
31 Burnet, Second Remarks, p. 11.
32 Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen, ed. Bernard Gert (Indianapolis, 1991), p. 41.
33 Hobbes, Man and Citizen, pp. 42-3.
34 Locke, Essay, p. 516; cf. p. 560.
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kind of creature he had made.35 As Pufendorf had already explained in the 
Elementorum, while our moral obligations arise ‘from imposition [ex impositione]’, it 
is ‘not the arbitrary [arbitraria] imposition of men, but that of the Creator himself’, 
and thence arises ‘of necessity [necessario]’.36
Locke jumps on this bandwagon, unperturbed by any contradiction with his 
claim that moral ideas are manufactured by men. Echoing Pufendorf in his own early 
work on the topic, Locke says that God could have ‘created man differently’, but 
having made him the way he chose, man’s duties follow necessarily [sequuntur 
necessario], giving him a ‘fixed and permanent rule of morals’.37 Human beings 
invent all manner of rules, such as eating one’s enemies, but as he declares in his 
Essay, there is only one ‘true touchstone of moral rectitude’: the natural law, ‘that 
Law which God has set to the actions of men’.38 As he stated in ‘Of Ethic in General’, 
a manuscript from the late 1680s: by contrast with purely conventional morality, the 
true ‘rules of good and evil’ are (though made) ‘not made by us But for us’.39
III
In this two-tiered metaphysics, the moral law above, morally indifferent nature below, 
it looks like the only way in which human beings can ascend to the moral sphere is 
through the interconnected exercise of reason and liberty. This was a recognisably 
scholastic commitment. As Suárez had stipulated, explicitly adducing Aristotle, there 
are ‘three conditions’ that must be met for a ‘moral action’ to count as ‘good’: first, 
‘the act shall be performed with sufficient knowledge’; second ‘that it shall be freely 
and deliberately performed’, and third ‘that it shall not only concern a righteous 
object, but shall also be attended by all the circumstances requisite to the 
righteousness of an act’.40 In addition to acting freely and knowingly, if your action is 
to qualify as moral, you must also, according to Suárez, have a moral motive. It is not 
enough for you simply to perform virtue. You have to mean it. 
35 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 13. 
36 Pufendorf, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis, trans. William Abbott Oldfather (2 vols., 
Oxford, 1931), II, p. 7; I (Latin), p. 6. 
37 Locke, Essays, p. 199.  
38 Locke, Essay, p. 71; 352.
39 Locke, ‘Of Ethic in General’ in MS Locke c. 28, fos. 146r-152r, fo. 151r. 
40 Francisco Suárez, A Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver, in Selections from Three Works, trans. 
Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi Brown, John Waldron, and Henry Davis (2 vols., Oxford, 1944), II, p. 
233.
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Pufendorf and Locke, revealing their scholastic roots, rehearse this view. What 
sets men apart from other animals, says Pufendorf, is their reason and their free will, 
and it is on account of these two faculties, and these alone, that men are able, unlike 
everything else, to ascend to the moral sphere.41 
Only if you are rational can you understand the law you are under, and be 
accountable for its breach.42 That is why children and the insane, whose minds are 
insufficiently rational, cannot be moral agents. Like lions, or falling rocks, they 
cannot comprehend what they ought to do and why, and so cannot be blamed for 
doing the wrong thing. Both Pufendorf and Locke are sometimes tentative about our 
capacity to gain demonstrative knowledge of the natural law, veering instead towards 
probabilism and revelation, Locke in the Scripture-engrossed twilight of his life in his 
The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), and Pufendorf always in the postlapsarian 
gloom.43 However, both authors are adamant that one way or another human beings 
can work out what God commands. This is perhaps especially so for Locke, sceptical 
about original sin, echoing with Socinianism, and sometimes avid with the hope of a 
moral science as transparent as the angles of a triangle.44 This ‘Light’ of reason, says 
Pufendorf, enables us to outshine ‘the Condition of Brute Creatures’.45 We escape the 
moral blindness of the rest of nature by being reflective, intelligent creatures.
Freedom seems to be a further indispensable condition of morality, and a 
spectacular kind of freedom at that. Both Pufendorf and Locke, the former 
categorically, the latter with some prevarication, seem to say that in order to be held 
morally accountable, you need not only to possess freedom of action, but freedom of 
the will as well. If, that is, you are to be legitimately praised or blamed for your 
41 Pufendorf, Duty, p. 28.
42 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 20; Locke, Essay, p. 517.
43 See, e.g., Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 113; Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, in John 
Locke: Writings on Religion, ed. Victor Nuovo (Oxford, 2002), pp. 85-210, p. 195. See Peter Harrison, 
‘The Bible and the emerging ‘scientific’ world-view’, in Cameron, ed., The New Cambridge History, 
pp. 620-40; on the “Enlightenment’s” scepticism about reason and reliance on revelation, see Thomas 
Ahnert, The Moral Culture of the Scottish Enlightenment 1690-1805 (New Haven, 2015).
44 Locke, Reasonableness, p. 92; 190; cf. Locke, Essays, p. 183; Idem, Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1988), p. 305. See David Wootton, ‘John Locke: Socinian 
or Natural Law Theorist?’, in James E. Crimmins, ed., Religion, secularization and political thought: 
Thomas Hobbes to J. S. Mill (London, 1990), pp. 39-67; John Marshall, ‘Locke, Socininanism, 
‘Socinianism’, and Unitarianism’, in M. A. Stewart, ed., English Philosophy in the Age of Locke 
(Oxford, 2000), pp. 111-82; S.J. Savonius-Wroth, ‘‘Lovers of Truth’ in Pierre Bayle’s and John 
Locke’s Thought’, in Sarah Mortimer and John Robertson, eds., The Intellectual Consequences of 
Religious Heterodoxy 1600-1750 (Leiden, 2012), pp. 155-80; Sarah Mortimer, Reason and Religion in 
the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism (Cambridge, 2014); Nicholas Jolley, Locke’s 
Touchy Subjects: Materialism and Immortality (Oxford, 2015). 
45 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 19. 
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actions, you need to be unconstrained not only by external forces, but by internal 
forces too. You need, to put it in the classic formulation, not only to have been able to 
have done otherwise, but also to have been free to choose otherwise. As Aristotle had 
put it in the Nicomachean Ethics, one is ‘neither praised nor blamed for our passions’, 
because these are out of our control. Instead, ‘virtues are modes of choice’.46 Morality 
depends therefore not simply on outward power, but also on inward autonomy. 
In making this case, Pufendorf is siding with a long line of Schoolmen against 
Hobbes, who had dismissed their concept of ‘free-will’ as ‘Absurd, Insignificant, and 
Non-sense’. Hobbes had said that there is no difference between men and other 
animals with regard to the will, that men, just like beasts, act as a result of a 
‘continuall chaine’ of desires, that the will is simply the ‘last Appetite in 
Deliberating’, and therefore, relishing the etymology, precisely the moment of 
‘Deliberation’ – the stripping away of liberty. Liberty for Hobbes is simply a 
predicate of bodies – just as water is free if it is undammed, so a man is free if his 
body is unconstrained by chains or other ‘externall Impediments’.47 
Pufendorf rounds on this analysis by insisting that if men are assimilated into 
nature in this way then all scope for morality dissolves. If a person is going to be 
rightly rewarded or punished for their actions, they cannot, like Hobbes’ river, be 
moved inexorably by natural necessity. They cannot, like other animals, be 
determined by their passions. In order to be fully free and therefore truly accountable, 
they must be able to withstand the ‘force and sway’ of ‘Appetite and … Aversion’. 
They must, that is, be able to stand as it were apart from action and desire, to decide 
whether to act or not in response to what makes the heart flutter and sink. They must, 
to put it in the language so beloved of Franciscan voluntarists like Scotus and Ockham 
that Pufendorf is echoing, have wills that possess ‘Indifference’ as well as 
‘Spontaneousness’. Without ‘this Indifference’, Pufendorf states unequivocally, ‘all 
the Morality [moralitas funditus] of Human Actions is inevitably overthrown’.48 An 
indifferent will is, as the Latin reveals, foundational to the moral universe. It cleaves 
all action in two – ‘natural actions’ on the one hand, ‘produced by powers which are 
in one by nature’, and ‘moral actions’ on the other, produced ‘by the decision of the 
46 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford, 1980), p. 36.
47 Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge, 1996), p. 34; 146; 45; 145. Cf. Quentin Skinner, 
‘Thomas Hobbes on the Proper Signification of Liberty’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 
40 (1990), pp. 121-51.
48 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, pp. 27-8; De Jure, p. 51.
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will’.49 Human beings must, says Pufendorf, have ‘the freedom of Determination’, or, 
now using another textbook locution that Locke too will pick up, ‘the Liberty’ of 
‘suspending … Actions, without being confin’d to any necessary Course’.50 There can 
be nothing necessary or determined about our actions. Our will must be entirely free, 
if we are to be properly classed as moral agents.
At first sight, in the first edition of the Essay, Locke looks like he is taking 
Hobbes’s side and enmeshing human beings in precisely the deterministic chain of 
cause and effect that Pufendorf has insisted we must transcend. Indeed, Locke laughs 
at the idea that the will might be free, as if it were itself a little agent scuttling about a 
man’s mind. To will is simply that, the activity of willing – and to ask whether this 
activity is free or not is like asking whether ‘Sleep be Swift’. Once a man is willing, 
that is it, his mind is made up; it is precisely ‘determined’. Moreover, the last thing 
one wants, pace Pufendorf and his voluntarist forbears, is ‘a perfect Indifferency in 
the Mind’. What you want, if you want to flourish, is a mind that is determined by 
what is good for you, a life that is ‘under the necessity of being happy’.51 Here lies the 
distinctive summit of the liberty of man: determination of the will by the good. Being 
free is simply being able to act according to one’s will.  
On closer inspection, however, and in subsequent editions of the Essay, Locke 
smuggles back in a kind of freedom of the will. Recalling Pufendorf’s exact verbs, 
Locke says that we have the power ‘to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from 
determining the will’. In the end the will must be determined, the mind must be made 
up, or else we would never do anything, like Buridan’s ass dying between the hay and 
water. Before we decide, however, we are free ‘to hold our wills undetermined’ while 
we ‘weigh’ the objects of desire, to assess whether they really do represent our good, 
or whether in fact, and as is often the case, they will result in short-term pleasure and 
long-term pain, and are therefore better ignored. Moreover, says Locke, now falling 
precisely into step with Pufendorf, it is this power to resist the pressures of passion, 
this power to rise above the deterministic chain of cause and effect, that turns us into 
49 Pufendorf, Elementorum, II, p. 5. 
50 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 27; 2. 
51 Locke, Essay, p. 240; 264; 265. See Vere Chappell, ‘Locke on the freedom of the will’, in Idem, ed., 
Locke (Oxford, 1998), pp. 86-105; James Harris, Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in 
Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy (Oxford, 2005); Walter Ott, Causation and Laws of Nature in 
Early Modern Philosophy (Oxford, 2009).
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moral creatures. It is because there is no necessity about what we will, because ‘a  
Man is at Liberty in respect of willing’ that he may ‘justly incur punishment’.52
Reason and freedom are not just two separate conditions for morality, but as 
Locke indicates, they fuse, and in turn fuse into morality itself. The exercise of that 
quintessentially human freedom, as opposed to the freedom of rivers and wolves, is 
the exercise of reason that in turn determines the good. It is, as Pufendorf says, using 
exactly the same metaphor as Locke, the power to ‘weigh [trutinare]’ in one’s mind 
‘the opposite Reasons of Good and Evil’. It is that which constitutes the archetypal 
‘liberty’ of a ‘Man’ – the power to withstand the torrents of desire through reflection, 
the power (now back in Locke’s text) to ‘judge’ and ‘examine’ the good and evil of 
the situation. It is indeed, announces Locke, nothing other than ‘deliberation’, 
delightedly snatching back the word from Hobbes, making it not about the loss of 
freedom but its expansion – deliberation in the sense of rational scrutiny, in the sense 
of deliberative democracy, a careful pause, a block to the headlong rush of prejudice 
and feeling, thereby coming to see and enact the true good.53 
Reason and freedom also coalesce as a condition of morality insofar as acting 
freely for Pufendorf and Locke involves choice; as Locke says, for the actions of a 
person to count as moral they ‘must be imputed to his own election’ – and the very 
notion of choice involves a particular kind of mental awareness.54 Acting with 
‘reason’, says Pufendorf, involves ‘operating with a kind of freedom of choice’.55 In 
order to be commended or censured for our actions, in order for them truly to belong 
to us, they must occur as a result of conscious, unforced choice, rather than drifting 
unreflectively in a particular direction, or being pushed or nudged that way by passion 
or impulse. As Pufendorf explains, for an action to count as voluntary, and as yours, it 
has to be ‘made with Reason and with Thought’.56 Indeed, your bodily involvement is 
not necessary; you might enjoin someone else to act for you but you would still be the 
‘author’ of that action.57 Being an ‘agent’, or ‘moral cause’ involves you acting 
knowingly, as opposed to being acted upon, or sleep-walking into action.58 The 
‘consummation’ of ‘obligation’ needs ‘recognition [intellectum]’ of the obligation.59 
52 Locke, Essay, p. 266; 267; 263; 270. 
53 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 20; De Jure, p. 36; Locke, Essay, p. 263; 267.
54 Locke, Essay, p. 271.
55 Pufendorf, Elementorum, II, p. 3. Cf. Locke, Essay, p. 277.
56 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 27.
57 Pufendorf, Elementorum, II, p. 5. 
58 Pufendorf, Elementorum, II, p. 4. 
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As so often in this demanding picture of morality, Suárez flickers in the 
background. For an action to count as good, he had insisted, it has to be enacted 
‘wittingly – that is, with knowledge [ex scientia, seu cognitione]’.60 If you act 
virtuously ‘casually and … incidentally’, such as by giving alms to the poor without 
knowing that you ought to do so, then you cannot be said to fulfil the obligation. In 
good Aristotelian style, morality requires not just the ‘material’ element, but the 
‘formal’ one too. Moreover, it is not enough to obey the law out of a beleaguered 
sense of obligation; you have to ‘be inspired by a righteous motive’.61 Pufendorf 
follows suit. For an action to count as ‘Morally Good or Evil’, he says, it must ‘not 
only conform to the Law in all its Material Requisites and Conditions’, but also ‘in 
respect of its Formality’. It must, that is, proceed from the proper ‘Intention’. Indeed, 
he goes on to say that ‘intention’ ‘is a Principle of the greatest Force in determining 
the Action’s Quality’.62 Locke agrees that ‘the intention of the Mind’ is an integral 
part of a moral action.63 
The colours seem to be dry on the picture of morality. To do good, it looks 
like you have to choose it, freely, consciously, and for its own sake. You have to fly 
above the plants and the winds and the wolves, and all the rest of nature which bends 
irresistibly to God’s will, unreflective and unfree and unable to own any of its 
actions.64 While most things are operated, puppet-like, by, as Pufendorf puts it, ‘the 
sole Instinct of Nature’, human beings have a stiff concoction of ‘Liberty’ and the 
‘Light of Understanding’ that detaches them from their strings and turns them into 
moral agents.65 This concoction creates subjects at a distance from their possible 
actions. It gives them, to use Locke’s evocative metaphor, the power of ‘standing 
still’ against the onslaught of passion and impulse, steadfastly retaliating with the 
painstaking exertion of reason.66 Note the self-control, the self-restraint of the good 
man, for whom true liberty is not ‘Licence’ but rather the will tempered by, moderated 
by, reason – a matter of putting up hedges to prevent one falling into ‘Bogs and 
59 Pufendorf, Elementorum, II, p. 9; I, p. 8.
60 Suárez, Treatise on Law, II, p. 237; I (Latin), p. 141.
61 Suárez, Treatise on Law, II, pp. 239-40.
62 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 60.
63 Locke, Essay, p. 478.
64 Locke, Essays, p. 109.
65 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 2. 
66 Locke, Essay, p. 266.
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Precipices’ like hangovers, or adultery.67 The good man depicted here is involved in a 
struggle, rowing against the tides of his deeper nature. The man who is stopping 
himself being determined by the first, short-sighted desire that pops, or floods, into his 
head, is a man who is straining, a man of action rather than passivity. He is 
continually fighting to keep his desires and automatic responses at bay. As Pufendorf 
explains in the 1688 edition of De Jure, ‘that part of the Mind where the … Passions 
are seated, is in it self irrational’. They need to be ‘diligently kept under 
[refraenentur]’.68 Kennet’s English translation is interesting here, indicating the 
geography of virtue as something that is above unreason. The Latin brings us back to 
where we began: to morality as a curb, a bridle, on nature.
IV
I want to suggest, however, that on Pufendorf’s and Locke’s own accounts, nature is 
not always opposed to virtue. They come together in two ways. First, virtue springs 
often, perhaps always, from overwhelming animal passions. Second, and more 
fundamentally, it appears to run in the grain of us. The lines smudge between nature 
and normativity, and the picture of the moral and political agent needs to be redrawn. 
The role of the passions in early-modern moral and political theory is an 
exciting area of scholarship, commentators moving beyond the calcified dichotomy of 
reason and passion, and exploring the ways in which philosophers integrated passions 
into their accounts of cognition and the good life. While part of what I have done 
above is reemphasise the extent to which Pufendorf and Locke are wedded to the old 
dichotomy, I want now to build on the revisionist elements in the historiography. I 
want to show not only how for these authors passions underpin morality, but also how 
the concept of moral obligation that they try to hive off from physical necessity, 
sometimes emerges as inseparable from it. They want to hold obligation in a pure 
juridical space, unsullied and unthreatened by passion and coercion, but I argue that 
they cannot staunch the pollution. 
I begin with that passion that reason is never far behind: self-love – that 
interest in surviving, in thriving, that we are endlessly ingenious in satisfying. While, 
above, we saw Pufendorf reinscribing the old Aristotelian line between men and 
67 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 270; 305. See Brian Tierney, Liberty and Law: The Idea of Permissive 
Natural Law, 1100-1800 (Washington, 2014); Duncan Kelly, The Liberty of Propriety: Persons, 
Passions & Judgement in Modern Political Thought (Princeton, 2011), pp. 20-58.
68 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 31; De Jure (Amsterdam, 1688), p. 42.
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brutes that Hobbes had erased, we now find him assimilating humans back into the 
animal sphere. ‘In common with all living things which have a sense of themselves’, 
he declares, ‘man holds nothing more dear than himself’. ‘This passion’, he goes on, 
‘is usually so strong that all other passions give way before it’, as it motors us along, 
leaving other considerations in its wake.69 Self-interest has employed the guidance of 
reason so habitually that it is hard to tell where one ends and the other begins. This 
passion knows that if you want to survive, you need the help of other human animals, 
if you want to be ‘safe [salvus]’, you must be ‘sociable [sociabilis]’.70 Or as Locke 
puts it in his Two Treatises of Government (1689), quoting ‘the Judicious Hooker’, ‘if 
I do harm, I must look to suffer’.71 Locke is more insistent than Pufendorf about the 
relative priorities of utilitas and honestum, stressing, like Cicero, that utility ought to 
be the serendipitous consequence of righteousness, rather than the source of its 
motivation, or even its obligation.72 However, even Locke, especially after his 
hedonistic turn, affirms that ‘Interest’, to which men ‘are so constantly true’, draws 
them to obey ‘the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, which the Law of God 
hath established’.73
Both authors are voicing the ancient yearning for justice to pay, for the world 
to be ordered so the just man is happy.74 They make a further move in this direction, 
bringing morality and desire closer together, when they assert that divinely-designed 
nature promotes virtue and discourages vice. At this point, there is a shift in the light. 
Nature appears in a new guise, no longer brutal and unreasonable, but wise and 
benign. She is transfigured into a judicious mistress, dispensing rewards and 
punishments, respectively, for good and evil deeds. In his goodness, ‘the Creator’, 
expounds Pufendorf, has made certain advantages and disadvantages flow ‘by a 
Natural Consequence’ of the observance and transgression of nature’s laws. So, for 
example, ‘Disquiet of Conscience’ and ‘Destruction of the Body’, follow fast on the 
heels of iniquity, whereas virtue automatically results in ‘Serenity and Security of 
69 Pufendorf, Duty, p. 33. 
70 Pufendorf, Duty, p. 35; De Officio Hominis et Civis (Oxford, 1927), p. 21. On Pufendorfian sociality, 
see James Tully, ‘Introduction’, in Pufendorf, Duty, pp. xiv-xxxvii; Istvan Hont, ‘Introduction’, in 
Jealousy of Trade (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), pp. 37-51; Fiammetta Palladini, ‘Pufendorf Disciple of 
Hobbes: The Nature of Man and the State of Nature: The Doctrine of Socialitas’, History of European 
Ideas, 34 (2008), pp. 26-60; Kari Saastamoinen, ‘Pufendorf on Natural Equality, Human Dignity, and 
Self-Esteem’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 71 (2010), pp. 39-62.
71 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 270.
72 Locke, Essays, p. 215. Cf. Cicero, On Duties, trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge, Mass., 1913), p. 280. 
73 Locke, Essay, p. 356.
74 Plato, The Republic, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge, 2000), p. 22.
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Conscience’, ‘Preservation of the Body from many Evils’, ‘besides an infinite number 
of advantages, which may be obtain’d by the mutual Benevolence and Good Offices 
of other Men [ex benevolentia & mutuis officiis aliorum hominum]’.75 There is an 
interesting discrepancy with the Latin here. While Kennet moves ‘mutual’ to go with 
‘Benevolence’, thereby subsuming that quality into the instrumental logic of 
reciprocity and trade, Pufendorf adverts to a natural well-spring of unconditional 
warmth for, and generosity to others, of the sort that we might associate with 
Hutcheson and his fans, and that we will see more of below. For now, we note the 
natural advantages and disadvantages that accompany virtue and vice. Here, too, later 
enlightenment thinkers come to mind, and their realm of transparent providence. It 
appears that seventeenth-century philosophers had already begun to theorise this 
realm. 
This is another side of early-modern natural jurisprudence, where nature is not 
opposed to morality but rather arranged to encourage it. Pufendorf singles out Richard 
Cumberland as having articulated the idea of ‘Natural Rewards’ and ‘Punishments’.76 
As with so much in Cumberland, we find the same in Hobbes. The ‘Naturall Lawes’, 
we read in Leviathan (1651), are backed up by ‘Naturall Punishments’, so that, for 
example, ‘Intemperance, is naturally punished with Diseases; Rashnesse, with 
Mischances; Injustice, with the Violence of Enemies; Pride, with Ruine; cowardise, 
with Oppression’, and – in a pair of warnings that take our breath away only to bring 
it back – ‘Negligent government of Princes, with Rebellion; and Rebellion, with 
Slaughter’.77 Locke falls into line, referring in ‘Of Ethic in General’ to ‘natural good 
& evil which by the natural efficiency of the thing produces pleasure or paine in us’. 
The ‘headache or sicknesse’ that proceeds from ‘drinking to Excesse’ ‘is a natural 
evil’ that God has providentially ordained to keep us sober.78
The wheels of pleasure and pain can be heard whirring relentlessly in the 
background of our moral lives. As Locke comes clean in the Essay: ‘Nature, I 
confess, has put into Man a desire of Happiness, and an aversion to Misery’. Holding 
loosely for a moment to his own mantra that the mind is a blank slate, and indicating 
the normative depth of human nature, he declares that these ‘innate practical 
Principles … continue constantly to operate and influence all our Actions, without 
75 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 116; De Jure (Amsterdam), p. 153.
76 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 116. 
77 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 253-4.
78 Locke, ‘Of Ethic’, fos. 149v-150r.
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ceasing’. While moral man had appeared to transcend the machine of nature, he is 
now refigured as a machine himself, whose desires are the ‘Springs and Motives of all 
our Actions’ that we ‘perpetually feel’ ‘strongly impelling us’.79 Picking up the 
metaphor later, Locke explains that ‘Good and Evil, are the hinges on which our 
Passions turn’.80 Pufendorf chimes in with his account of the passions which, as the 
Latin demonstrates, impel (‘impellunt’) the will to action having been stimulated by 
the perception of boni aut mali.81 There is, it turns out, pace the opposite view that we 
met above, ‘no Indifference’ with regard to the general inclination of the will, 
determined as it is towards the ‘agreeable’ or ‘Good’, away from the ‘disagreeable’ or 
‘Bad’.82 We saw Locke make this point with regard to a will determined by reason, 
but here we see him and Pufendorf sliding into a will determined by passion, as 
morality tips into nature. The rational and free agent that we thought we saw clearly is 
now resolving into an automaton. 
Good and evil re-emerge, in this alternative picture, not only as motivated by 
the sensations of pleasure and pain, but moreover as the names of the things that cause 
those sensations. When Locke is deep in this empiricist vein, ‘Good’ is simply the 
name of that which produces pleasure, and ‘Evil’ the name of the source of pain.83 
While so-called ‘naturall’ goods, like sobriety, bring us pleasure according to the 
natural chain of cause and effect, ‘morall’ goods are those things which do not 
naturally result in pleasure, but which ‘by the intervention of the will of an intelligent 
free agent,’ draw ‘pleasure or paine after’ them.84 Moral goods, that is, are those 
things for which God will reward us. 
Not only are the referents of moral goods often the same as those of natural 
goods, but God turns out to be the manipulator of our limbs. All the dazzling 
architecture of natural religion seems to melt away like a mirage. Having designed us 
to seek pleasure, and avoid pain, God then dangles heaven and hell in front of us, and 
operates us accordingly. These are bliss and torment of such extravagant, 
unsurpassable, proportions, that if we were only to see them for what they are, we 
79 Locke, Essay, p. 67. See James Tully, ‘Governing conduct: Locke on the reform of thought and 
behaviour’, in An approach to political philosophy: Locke in contexts (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 179-241.
80 Locke, Essay, p. 229. 
81 Pufendorf De Jure, p. 55.
82 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 29.
83 Locke, Essay, p. 229.
84 Locke, ‘Of Ethic’, fo. 149v.
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would bend inexorably to our inventor’s will. There is not a man alive who would not 
give up in a heartbeat every passing earthly lust for a taste of the food in heaven.85 
 It is hard to see how these Epicurean marionettes might count as the moral 
persons we met above. If you do the right thing not because it is the right thing to do 
but rather because you stand to gain from it, and if you are thinking of the subjective 
rather than the objective good, then morality seems to reduce to a combination of self-
interest and base, unreflective passion. Moreover, if you are a puppet on a string, then 
your agency seems to evaporate.
Pufendorf and Locke try to manage these threats to moral personhood in their 
accounts of law, motivation, and obligation. Both authors are clear that part of the 
definition of law is that it must be accompanied by sanctions. Otherwise, it would 
simply be advice or counsel. ‘It would be utterly in vain,’ elaborates Locke, ‘to 
suppose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man, without annexing to it some 
Enforcement of Good and Evil, to determine his Will’.86 What makes a law a law is 
that it is backed up by rewards and punishments – pleasures and pains – of precisely 
the sort we have just seen described. But that is not why one should obey it. Indeed, 
on the severest interpretation, handed down by Suárez, if an action is not performed 
out of love of justice for its own sake, but rather from the fear of punishment, then the 
actor is said to be ‘unwilling [involuntarium]’.87 
Pufendorf and Locke do not take such a hard line, conceding that rewards and 
punishments may be a source of motivation, carrots and sticks for the weak of will. 
They simply cannot be the source of obligation. The source of obligation had long 
been a thorny debate between rationalists and voluntarists, and while Pufendorf and 
Locke do their own little dances around the issue, both agree that we are obliged to 
obey God’s commands primarily because he has a right over us, and (though this does 
not underpin his right) he is good. This right-good synthesis is the source of 
obligation, and is separate from the source of motivation – which might be sanctions. 
Here is Locke tiptoeing between the lines: God rules us by law because: ‘He has a 
Right to do it, we are his Creatures: He has Goodness and Wisdom to direct our 
85 Locke, Essay, pp. 272-7.
86 Locke, Essay, p. 351. 
87 Suárez, Treatise of Law, II, p. 234; I, p. 140. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 
(Oxford, 1980), p. 348; passim; Thomas Pink, ‘Reason and obligation in Suárez’, in Benjamin Hill and 
Henrik Lagerlund, eds., The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez (Oxford, 2012), pp. 175-208; Terence H. 
Irwin, ‘Obligation, rightness, and natural law: Suárez and some critics’, in Daniel Schwartz, ed., 
Interpreting Suárez: Critical Essays (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 142-62. 
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Actions to that which is best: and he has Power to enforce it by Rewards and 
Punishments, of infinite weight and duration, in another Life: for no body can take us 
out of his hands.’88 However, for all that Locke and Pufendorf try and avoid the 
charge of instrumentalism by distinguishing between obligation and motivation, they 
smudge the distinction. Moreover, it looks as though most men, with God’s blessing, 
have their tongues out, and their tails wagged, at the prospect of eternal delight, not 
mindfully choosing the good for its own sake, nor obviously free to resist the strings 
that pull them this way and that.
Which brings us to the question of God’s power. As we saw in Section III, 
what makes a law a law, in addition to sanctions, is that one is free to disobey it, to 
ignore those sanctions – otherwise it is violence or coercion, and one cannot be said to 
be the author of one’s actions in such conditions. Again, Pufendorf and Locke step 
gingerly around God’s power, wanting it to be both more, and less, than brute force – 
needing it to be legitimate authority (as opposed to pure muscle), and something 
which one is free to resist. A law, that is, must be both good and non-compulsive. 
Continuing to defend the motivation/obligation distinction, our authors try to proffer a 
concept of law that treads the fine line between right and might. As Locke insists, ‘not 
all obligation seems to consist in, and ultimately to be limited by, that power 
[potentia] which can coerce offenders and punish the wicked, but rather to consist in 
the authority and dominion [potestate et dominio] which someone has over another’.89 
A rightful ‘law maker’, he summarises, is ‘one that has a superiority & right to 
ordeyne & also a power to reward & punish’.90 As Pufendorf puts it, ‘Obligation 
differs from down-right Compulsion [obligation differ à coactione]’ (Kennet 
characteristically adds the ‘downright’), because the driving of the will does not occur 
‘undeservedly [non immerito]’.91 Furthermore, as we recall, in order to exist in that 
peculiar juridical space of an obligation, one must, as Pufendorf says, have ‘a Will 
intrinsically free, able to steer contrary ways’ to the obligation.92 Obligation, properly 
understood, must not take ‘away the Wills intrinsick Liberty’.93 ‘To compel, and to 
88 Locke, Essay p. 352. Cf. Pufendorf, Duty, p. 36.
89 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 49; Locke, Essays, pp. 183-5.
90 Locke, ‘Of Ethic’, fo. 152r.
91 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 47; De Jure, p. 82.
92 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 49. 
93 Pufendorf, Law of nature, p. 32. 
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oblige [cogere, & obligare]’, protests Pufendorf (too much, I think), ‘are very 
different Matters’.94
The notion of obligation had always balanced precariously, even in its 
etymology, between real and metaphorical ties, and if we look at two eighteenth-
century dictionaries we find it cashed out as both to ‘compel, constrain, force’, and ‘to 
bind by contract or oath’.95 Both Pufendorf and Locke try to hold the moral apart from 
the physical, harking back to the scholastic idea of the delicate internal, metaphorical 
tie that binds the conscience in foro interno, the internal court that judges us.96 As 
Locke puts it, ‘all obligation binds conscience and lays a bond [vinculum] on the mind 
itself, so that not fear of punishment, but a rational apprehension of what is right, puts 
us under an obligation, and conscience passes judgement on morals’.97 Pufendorf 
explains in De Jure that obligations ‘as it were, cast an inward Tie and Restraint [velut 
vinculum] upon the Liberty of our Wills’.98 Adverting again in De Officio to the 
analogical and colloquial quality of the concept, he explains that ‘Obligation is 
commonly defined as a bond of right [vulgo … obligatio dicitur vinculum juris]’. It is, 
he elaborates, reaching for further idioms to grasp hold of the evasive concept, 
supposed to put ‘a kind of bridle [quasi fraenum] on our liberty, so that, though the 
will can in fact take different directions it yet finds itself imbued by it with an internal 
sense (so to speak), so that it is compelled to recognize that it has not acted rightly’.99 
It is instructive that the definitions of obligation lie in similes and metaphors. It is as 
though the concept itself is slippery, struggling to find its referent.
Our authors scramble to maintain the lightness of obligation that is required to 
stop it plummeting towards coercion. Obligation must not involve ‘necessity’, 
contends Pufendorf.100 When one is under an ‘Obligation’, this is ‘Moral’, whereas 
when one is forced, this is ‘Physical’, and ‘ariseth’ from ‘Necessity’.101 And yet this 
sounds like precisely what he says God’s sanctions do; they impose ‘an internal 
94 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 50; De Jure, p. 88.
95 Thomas Dyche and William Pardon, A new general English Dictionary (London, 1737), sig. Zzz3v; 
A. Fisher, An Accurate new Spelling Dictionary and Expositor of the English Language (1777), sig. 
S2v.
96 Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 110.
97 Locke, Essays, p. 185.
98 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 52; De Jure, p. 93.
99 Pufendorf, Duty, p. 27; De Officio, p. 13
100 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 47.
101 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 49.
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necessity, and the power to compel [necessitatem … & vis cogendi]’.102 In the final 
analysis, ‘Obligations receive their final Strength and Authority from Force [Sic ut 
demum ultima velut firmitas obligationibus accedat à vi]’.103 While Kennet 
embellishes the Latin to ram home the uneasy intimacy between authority and force, 
Pufendorf’s ultimate recourse to vis is clear. As Locke puts it, without rewards and 
punishments, ‘the force of morality is lost and evaporates only into words and 
disputes and niceties.’104
Hobbes had been gleefully unperturbed by the coercive power of law. Laws 
are but ‘Artificiall Chains’, he crowed, not really chains at all, just words, threats of 
bondage. They leave men physically free, their liberty in the proper signification – the 
liberty of their bodies – intact.105 Indeed, there is of course no such thing as coercion 
for Hobbes. So-called internal impediments, violent passions like the fear of death, do 
not count as impediments to freedom, since only persons, not wills, can be free. 
Everything we do is caused by one passion or another. So long as one has options, 
even if those options are between the devil and the deep blue sea, one is still free to 
choose. The man who ‘throweth his goods into the Sea for feare the ship should sink’, 
does it ‘very willingly’.106 Here Hobbes is engaging with Aristotle, who had in his 
Nicomachean Ethics given this instance as an example of a ‘mixed’ action – one that 
is both voluntary and involuntary.107 Hobbes is responding that there is nothing mixed 
about it. It is purely voluntary, because ‘Feare, and Liberty are consistent’.108 That is 
why the monster of Leviathan legitimately obliges us, because ‘Covenants entred into 
by fear … are obligatory’.109 
Locke twitches. Squaring up against Hobbes, he insists that there can be 
internal impediments to freedom, that there is such a thing as coercion and that it 
takes away your liberty. When you promise because you are mortally afraid, your 
promise is not binding.110 When a man puts a gun to your head, and you give him 
your purse, you do not do so freely.111 That is extortion, not obligation.
102 Pufendorf, Duty, p. 29; De Officio, p. 15.
103 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 52; De Officio, p. 70. 
104 Locke, ‘Of Ethic’, fo. 150v.
105 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 147.
106 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 146.
107 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, p. 48. 
108 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 146.
109 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 97.
110 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 392. 
111 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 393.
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And Pufendorf, for his part, had weighed in on the case of the man on sinking 
boat. Agreeing with Aristotle, and rounding on Hobbes, Pufendorf repeats that some 
actions are ‘Mixt’, that is, ‘partly voluntary and partly involuntary’. The man who tips 
his property overboard does it ‘spontaneis & invitis’. So great is his fear of death that 
his will is ‘driven [adigatur]’ against itself, the ‘Obligation’ (note here, used in a non-
moral context), so ‘straight [rigida]’, that he is absolved of blame.112 Pufendorf’s 
verb, ‘adigere’, can mean both to bind by oath and to drive, drawing renewed 
attention to the instability of the concept of obligation, and how its moral form 
stumbles into its natural one. ‘The will’ of the boatman ‘is so vehemently urg’d and 
press’d’, that the resulting actions come under the heading of ‘necessity’.113
Passions, then, for Pufendorf and Locke can take away your freedom. Indeed, 
Locke goes so far as to compare their internal pressure to the external forces of the 
world. Just as a ‘Hurricane’ hurries ‘our Bodies’, so ‘a boisterous Passion hurries our 
Thoughts’, and renders us unfree.114 In a further instructive simile, Locke goes so far 
as to compare passions to ‘the Rack’.115 They can be so ‘violent’, he announces, that 
they allow ‘us not the liberty of thought’. Under a battery of emotions we are no 
longer ‘Masters … of our own Minds’.116 While Pufendorf wants to insist that the will 
can resist the ‘Violence’ of the passions, the language he uses to represent them tells a 
different story. Bubbling up from their ‘irrational’ home, they assault us with ‘sudden 
Sallies’. In a premonition of Freud, or a recollection of Plato, he suggests that they are 
like horses whose ‘Reins [habenis]’ have been let go, with the result that the mind is 
‘drag’d [trahi] by those it ought to guide’.117 
Seen now in this light, the obligations of morality, accompanied by 
incomparably terrifying hellfire and seductive paradise, look both more compulsive 
than obligatory, and as though they come from a place of unreason. Indeed, Pufendorf 
and, even more enthusiastically, his English translator, draw on the same image of 
‘Torture [tormentis]’ that Locke had deployed, a metaphor that slides uncomfortably 
into literalness in an age when the practice was common, to evoke the pain that 
‘proceed[s] from the Strength and Power of Almighty GOD [ex viribus DEI 
omnipotentis]’, through the providential mechanism of conscience. Pufendorf quotes 
112 Pufendorf, Law of nature, p. 33; De Jure, pp. 56-57. 
113 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 33.
114 Locke, Essay, p. 239. 
115 Locke, Essay, p. 267.
116 Locke, Essay, p. 268.
117 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 31; De Jure (Amsterdam), p. 42. Cf. Plato, Phaedrus 426a-b.
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Juvenal on the torture (‘tortore’) and whipping (‘flagellum’) that rages in what 
Thomas Creech translates as ‘a guilty Mind’.118 
Men are looking more like animals, like the beast machines that are prodded to 
their good, as opposed to human beings who freely, consciously march towards on it. 
Pufendorf and Locke might try to keep moral obligation away from the barage of 
instrumental motivation and irresistible coercion, but in their own texts, good and evil 
are descending into nature. The two spheres, moral and natural, seem to be dissolving 
into one another.
V
There is still, however, in the above account, a fissure between nature and 
normativity, between what we are and what we should be, a gap that God tries to 
close with the levers of our passions. In this section I suggest that Pufendorf and 
Locke sometimes go further, closing the gap completely, nature itself becoming 
normative, such that ‘is’ and ‘ought’ unite. We have seen the good start to fall to 
earth, but it remained at one remove, and was tied instrumentally to our basic 
instincts. Now, they appear indistinguishable. And God, whom we have just seen 
conduct our heart strings, melts slightly into the background. His providence is still at 
work but it is nature that shimmers on the page. 
Our authors are engaging with a discourse that posits the normativity of 
nature, an alternative discourse of natural law, in which there is a certain rightness to 
the progress of things, the kind of natural law that resembles the kind we might 
associate more with eighteenth-century theorists such as Hume and Vico. This 
discourse comprises many interweaving threads. It betrays an on-going affair with the 
value-laden, purposive nature of Aristotelianism that the new science had officially 
rejected. It flirts tentatively again with the innatism it is supposed to have spurned. It 
remembers, with Augustine, as well as Stoics, a prelapsarian, or golden, age of peace 
and natural fellowship. And it draws on particular conceptions of divine providence 
that have both Christian and pagan roots, that imagine a divinity running through the 
course of things rather than damming the noxious flow, a divinity that is part of nature 
rather than outside, punishing it, a divinity immanent in the activity of nature. The 
Stoics echo especially. To recall their basic equation, in Stobaeus’ words: ‘living in 
118 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 53; De Jure, p. 94.
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accordance with virtue’ is ‘the same’ as ‘living in accordance with nature.’119 Here is 
no circuitous route from nature to virtue, and certainly no gulf between the two, but 
rather a continuity that reappears on the pages of early-modern texts.
The deepest moral impulse is none other than self-love, seen now, though, not 
in its Epicurean incarnation, nor as instrumentalising rational self-interest, but rather 
as a basic way in which God cares for his dearest creation. Cato, in Cicero’s De 
Finibus, had proudly explained how the Stoics believe that ‘immediately upon birth 
… a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and impulse to preserve itself and to 
feel affection for its own constitution’; this ‘love of self … supplies the primary 
impulse to action’.120 Pufendorf repeats the point: ‘self-love is implanted deep in man; 
it compels him to have a careful concern for himself’. Evoking the dignity of this 
irresistible impulse, Pufendorf characterises it as nothing less than a moral ‘obligation 
[obligationem]’; we are bound by right (as well as might) to nurture the creator’s most 
extraordinary handiwork, and not to squander his gifts.121 Locke agrees, declaring that 
man is ‘obliged to preserve himself’. It is a ‘duty’, moreover, that he is ‘very much 
urged on to [impellatur]…by an inward instinct’.122 Obligation is now 
indistinguishable from instinct, and what looked like grubby selfishness is repaired to 
a worthy affection for a divine artefact, a moral urging that propels us automatically 
through life.
Beating alongside this love for ourselves is the more obviously virtuous love 
for others. In various ways, we are fitted for sociability, often at a cost to ourselves. 
Most basic are the instincts we share with other animals for sex and reproduction and, 
following that, for our offspring. This view had made its way into Roman law. The ius 
naturale emerges in the Digest of Justinian as that law which obliges even ‘wild 
beasts’, out of which ‘comes the union of man and woman which we call marriage, 
and the procreation of children, and their rearing’.123 Cicero homes in on the rearing 
of children. He identifies it as the irrepressible seed of sociable impulse, the ‘origin of 
the association of the human race in communities’.124 Augustine characterises our 
association with, and obligations to others as a matter of feral compulsion, again 
muddying the boundary between humans and animals, between global civility and the 
119 Long and Sedley, Hellenistic philosophers, I, p. 394.
120 Cicero, On Ends, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), pp. 233-5.
121 Pufendorf, Duty, p. 46. 
122 Locke, Essays, pp. 157-9. 
123 The Digest of Justinian, ed. Alan Watson (2 vols., Philadelphia, 1998), I, I.1.
124 Cicero, On Ends, p. 283.
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savagery of beasts. Even the most solitary and ferocious creatures, the tigress and the 
bird of prey purr and nest and care for their young. And humans do this and more. ‘A 
human being’ is ‘drawn by the laws of his nature’ beyond his nearest and dearest ‘to 
enter upon a fellowship with all his fellow-men and to keep peace with them’.125 
The natural law emerges in this alternative iteration as precisely the kind of 
law that the moral law was not supposed to be, a law that applies definitionally not to 
human beings, but to the rest of nature. It looks, that is, like the kind of law, in 
Locke’s words, that causes ‘the heaven’ to revolve ‘in unbroken rotation’, and 
regulates even ‘the wild sea [indomito mari]’ – a quasi-Newtonian law that moves us 
towards others, infuses us with fellow feeling, the kind of law that was revivified by 
Grotius after his Stoic turn in De iure belli ac pacis (1625) (a book recommended 
together with Pufendorf’s De Jure, by Locke in 1693 for nascent gentlemen).126 Like 
other animals – and here the self-sacrificial character of natural sociability comes into 
view – men ‘forget’ ‘their own interest, in favour of their young ones, or those of their 
own kind.’ Even children, says Grotius, completely unschooled in right and wrong, 
nevertheless have ‘a propensity to do good to others’.127 
Locke reprises these arguments. He preaches, for example, that ‘God in his 
infinite Wisdom has put strong desires of Copulation into the Constitution of Men, 
thereby to continue the race of Mankind’ (it is not obvious that Locke was speaking 
from experience).128 Like Augustine’s tigress, Locke’s parents ‘temper’ their ‘power’, 
God having put in them ‘Inclinations of Tenderness and Concern’ towards their 
children.129 The love for their offspring is so strong ‘that they sometimes neglect their 
own private good for it’. Throwing self-preservation to the wind, and ‘when their 
Young stand in need of it, the timorous become Valiant, the Fierce and Savage Kind, 
and the Ravenous Tender and Liberal’.130 This kind of precipitate virtue, that hurls us 
into heroism without a second thought, extends beyond the family and into ‘the 
commonwealth and all mankind’, reinscribing the same extravagantly sociable arc 
celebrated by Stoics. Locke adverts to Roman heroes, whose ‘toil, hazards, and 
125 Augustine, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth, 1984), p. 868.
126 Locke, Essays, pp. 108-9; Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, ed. John W. and Jean S. 
Yolton (Oxford, 1989), p. 239. See G.A.J. Rogers, ‘Locke, Law, and the Laws of Nature’, in Reinhardt 
Brandt, ed., John Locke: Symposium Wolfenbuttel 1979 (Berlin, 1981), pp. 146-62.
127 Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis, 2005), pp. 82-3. 
128 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 179.
129 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 309.
130 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 181.
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generosity’ flowed lavishly from their integrity.131 This is the ‘best’ kind of virtue, 
when ‘we do good to others at our own loss’.132 It seems to come naturally, springing 
up from the unthinking depths of our bodies.
There are two, higher order fittings of nature that promote the distinctively 
human community. The first is language, ‘that most Noble Instrument’, as Pufendorf 
calls it. It enables us to communicate complex thoughts and sentiments, and travel out 
of the solitude of our minds, into intersubjectivity.133 It is, now in Locke’s words, ‘the 
great Instrument, and common Tye of Society.’134 
The second peculiarly human trait that induces sociability is shame. In 1678, 
Locke wrote a manuscript that began: ‘The principal spring from which the actions of 
men take their rise, the rule they conduct them by, & the end to which they direct 
them seems to be credit & reputation, & that at any rate they avoid is in the greatest 
part shame & disgrace’.135 Locke thought that our skins are so thin, our concern for 
others’ judgement so fervent, that in his tripartite taxonomy of laws in the Essay, he 
lists ‘The Law of Opinion or Reputation’ alongside divine and civil law.136 
Countering those who think this a frivolous inclusion, he challenges them to consider 
the pain of disapproval, the pleasure of praise. Being snubbed by one’s peers is, 
Locke says, ‘a Burthen too heavy for human Sufferance’, and a deep and constant 
motor of our action.137 Pufendorf gives an equally, if not more innate, unreflective, 
and impulsive account of the ‘Passion of Shame’. Having argued that morality is 
imposed on, rather than inherent in things, he has to ‘confess’ that God seems to have 
‘mingled [insiturum]’ this ‘Passion’ in ‘Human Constitutions’ as a spur to doing the 
right thing. ‘Our very Blood’, says Pufendorf, ‘seems to have a natural sence of 
wicked Deeds’. More generally, when we feel ourselves dip in the estimation of our 
‘Neighbours’, ‘the heart … sends up [propellit] the Blood to be an outward Sign’ of 
131 Locke, Essays, p. 209.
132 Locke, Essays, p. 207.
133 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 109. For an elaboration of attitudes to language at the time, see 
Hannah Dawson, Locke, Language and Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge, 2007), and on Locke’s 
anxieties about language for sociability, see Dawson, ‘Locke on Language in (Civil) Society’, History 
of Political Thought, 26 (2005), pp. 397-425.
134 Locke, Essay, p. 402.
135 MS Locke f. 3, pp. 381-2, p. 381. See Tim Stuart-Buttle, ‘“A burthen too heavy for human 
sufferance”: Locke on reputation’, History of Political Thought, 38 (2017), pp. 644-88; Hannah 
Dawson, ‘Shame in early modern thought: from sin to sociality’, History of European Ideas (2018).
136 Locke, Essay, p. 353.
137 Locke, Essay, p. 357.
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our ‘deepest regret’.138 Again, it is the body that knows good from evil, the body that 
acts accordingly. If we compare this to those natural rewards and punishments that 
follow automatically from good and bad, and cause us to think again, to think better, 
now the sanctions are inside us. They have moved even further from head to heart.
Saturating the alternative, instinctive, portrait of morality is the Stoic concept 
of oikeiōsis – that ‘exquisite Desire of Society’, as Grotius translates it, ‘a certain 
inclination to live with those of his own kind’.139 In De Finibus, Cicero had talked 
about ‘the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such’, and which 
is ‘bestowed by nature’.140 In De Officiis, he repudiated the view that individuals 
come together only for expediency, preferring otherwise the vita contemplativa. He 
declared that even if all our practical needs were met, and we no longer required the 
company of other humans, we would flee our isolation, so drawn are we to creatures 
like ourselves.141 Like bees that gather not only to make honey but also ‘because they 
are gregarious by nature, so human beings – and to a much higher degree’ than bees – 
unite in communities.142
Even Pufendorf, who often veers towards a more instrumental, Hobbesian 
view of sociability than Locke, quotes approvingly from this section of De Officiis. 
Indeed, the citation comes straight after Pufendorf has been explaining why ‘it is 
necessary that he [man] be Social’ for reasons of self-preservation.143 This is one 
‘cause’ of sociability, he says, but there are other ‘arguments’ to demonstrate ‘a 
Sociable Nature in Man’, the first of which is that ‘nothing is more sad … than 
perpetual Solitude’. He then unleashes whole paragraphs of Cicero’s work to 
adumbrate the point that all of us, as a matter of deepest desire, ‘fly Solitude’. 
Sociability is part of our nature, one of our ‘inclinations’, something to which we are 
‘born’.144 As Pufendorf says in his own De Officio, ‘Nature herself has willed that 
there should be a kind of kinship [cognationem] among men’.145 While original sin 
suffuses Pufendorf’s vision, he has not forgotten that time in the beginning when man 
was ‘inclined’ ‘to love his neighbour’ ‘by nature’. Indeed, he runs it together with the 
138 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 16. De Jure, p. 27.
139 Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, pp. 84; 79-81. See Christopher Brooke, ‘Grotius, Stoicism and 
‘Oikeiosis’, Grotiana, 29 (2008), pp. 25-50.
140 Cicero, On Ends, p. 283.
141 Cicero, On Duties, p. 163.
142 Cicero, On Duties, p. 161. 
143 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 108.
144 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, pp. 109-10.
145 Pufendorf, Duty, p. 119; De Officio, p. 103.
Page 31 of 34
Cambridge University Press
The Historical Journal
32
bygone age described by Tacitus when ‘the earliest men … desired nothing contrary 
to good morals’.146 The edicts of morality are still ‘so closely interwoven with our 
Being’, as Kennet phrases it, that no one can be insensitive to them. The Latin is ‘ita 
penitus naturae insita’, evoking the organic way in which virtue is planted, or sown 
within us.147 The new picture does not obliterate the old, then, but juts up against it.
Picking up the same point in his Essays on the Law of Nature, Locke declares 
that the law of nature is ‘implanted in our hearts’, in von Leyden’s translation.148 The 
Latin, pectoribus nostris insitam, pushes the point home – the same earthy insitus that 
we saw in Pufendorf, and pectus, as well as heart, meaning chest, breast, the seat of 
passion, conjuring up a peculiarly embodied moral life. Oikeiōsis, and its Ciceronian 
iteration, positively sings through the following passage of Locke’s. Man, he says,
feels himself not only to be impelled by life’s experience and pressing 
needs to procure and preserve a life in society with other men, but also to 
be urged to enter into society by a certain propensity of nature 
[propensione quadam naturae incitari], and to be prepared for the 
maintenance of society by the gift of speech and through the intercourse of 
language, in fact as much as he is obliged [obligetur] to preserve 
himself.149 
This is the same double-faced presentation that we saw in Pufendorf: a sociality of 
desire, as well as need. If there were any doubt about Locke’s affiliations in this early 
text, he goes so far as to define the moral law there in explicitly Stoic terms, as ‘the 
rule of living according to nature [secundum naturam vivere]’.150
While this early work is Locke’s most sustainedly Stoic piece of writing, and 
while some of his views change subsequently, an intimacy between nature and 
morality remains. In the Two Treatises, for example, he adverts to both the 
‘Necessity’ and the ‘Inclination’ that ‘drive him [man] into Society’, to the ‘first 
Society’ ‘between Man and Wife’ that swells to children, to households, and finally to 
146 Pufendorf, Duty, p. 11. 
147 Pufendorf, Law of Nature, p. 21; De Jure, p. 38. 
148 Locke, Essays, pp. 132-3.
149 Locke, Essays, pp. 157-9.
150 Locke, Essays, p. 111; cf. p 109.
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civil society.151 There we have it: the blending of duty with utility and disposition, the 
collapsing of that neatly bisected world I described at the beginning of this article into 
one jostling whole. 
VI
While Pufendorf and Locke try to drain nature of its teleological colour, then, it seeps 
back in. There is morality in the machine, virtue in the beast. Actions with at least the 
complexion of goodness seem here to be performed by unreflective and unfree 
creatures. 
Where does this leave us? One might think that this is simply a contradiction, 
a mess. On the one hand, our authors announce a clean break between nature and 
morality, claiming that men can only transcend the necessity of nature through reason 
and freedom. On the other hand, they blur their own sharp lines between the two 
domains, and seem ultimately to offer up shadows of human agents. How can these 
automata, controlled by passion and impulse, be morally accountable?
Perhaps, in accordance with their naturalistic accounts of morality, Pufendorf 
and Locke are feeling their way towards a new model of agency. No more the 
dislocated subject, separated from her life by the illusions of intention and choice, but 
rather a person, whose actions are an emanation of her whole self, her desires and 
compulsions, her movement and her stillness, just as much as her considered 
thoughts. This agent is her actions. She cannot fly above nature; she is part of it, 
moved by forces she cannot control, but nonetheless a force herself. As Locke 
remarks suggestively, ‘nature must be altogether negated before one can claim for 
himself absolute liberty’.152 
This refigured conception of agency makes sense not only of the bewildering 
variety of social activity, but throws some helpful light on an aspect of Locke’s 
political theory that has long interested commentators.153 If we think of the most 
important occasion in the life of a Lockean citizen, that vertiginous instant when they 
have to know that the time has come for revolution, the holistic account of agency I 
have sketched promises to fill the yawning gap that critics have identified in Locke’s 
151 Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 318-9.
152 Locke, Essays, p. 123.
153 See John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge, 1689); Richard Bourke and 
Raymond Geuss, eds., Political Judgement: Essays for John Dunn (Cambridge, 2009).
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account of political judgement. Given that it was the poverty of people’s judgement 
that was the reason for government in the first place, why should Locke, his readers 
ask, have any faith in the people’s capacity to judge it once it has been set up? If, 
however, we no longer require the heights of rational understanding in order to 
qualify for moral and political action, then the galloping wave of obscure emotions 
and collective feeling which brings down a tyrant might meet the standard of virtue. 
And indeed, Locke points to the raw desperation that constitutes the grounds for 
legitimate civil disobedience. It will rightly come about, he says, when ‘the 
Inconvenience is so great, that the Majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a 
necessity to have it amended.’154 And when he returns to the subject later on in the 
text, he reverts to the language of passion and sensation to elucidate that extraordinary 
moment when power and right passes back to, or infuses, the people, when they 
transform from citizens back into men, when the mirage of the commonwealth melts 
back into the state of nature. At that moment, he says, ‘they cannot but feel, what they 
lie under’.155 Of course, as John Dunn saw, the brilliance of Locke’s theory is that it is 
resolutely bounded by reality, and Locke’s acute descriptions of how things are can 
be as depressing as they are revelatory.156 Just as trust is indispensable to political 
society, so political calculation is often more brutal, more felt, than deliberated, and 
the effects of this can be as catastrophic as they can be emancipatory. 
Moral and political judgement, then, like moral and political action, turns out 
to be as much a matter of sense and affect as it is of reason, as much a function of 
mechanical causation as it is of transcendent freedom. Pufendorf and Locke emerge 
from this article caught in a kind of metamorphosis, torn between law and nature, 
between the uncomfortable imposition of duty and organic virtue. As a result of this 
shifting equivocation, their relation to other figures and discourses shifts accordingly. 
They appear, for example, both more and less like Hobbes, more and less scholastic – 
and more and more like Hume and his fellow exponents of a moral sense and a 
descriptive natural law, whom they are not supposed to resemble at all. The landscape 
of early-modern moral theory is a space of ambivalence, and tangled, fraying 
languages that both constrain and are shaken off by its speakers. 
154 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 380 (my italics).
155 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 415.
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Political Agency’ in Interpreting Political Responsibility (Princeton, 1990), pp. 9-25 and pp. 26-44.
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